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COMMENTS
The Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions by New York State from a Legal
Perspective: Is a Tax or Market-Based
System Optimal?
Christopher Aung*
On April 2, 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued
its opinion in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency.1  As the first climate change case to reach the high
court, lines were drawn across the union.  The case pitted
neighboring states against each other as trade groups took sides
against not-for-profit groups, each claiming to better represent
the public interest.  The United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”) was opposed by a diverse group of litigants2
seeking the regulation of four greenhouse gases3 under the
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Pace University School of Law; M.E.M. Candidate,
2010, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies; B.S., 2005, Cornell
University.
1. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
2. Petitioners included twelve states (California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, and Washington), local governments (the District of Columbia, American
Samoa, New York City, and Baltimore), and public interest groups (Center for Bio-
logical Diversity, Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law Foundation, Environ-
mental Advocates, Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace,
International Center for Technology Assessment, National Environmental Trust,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists,
and U.S. Public Interest Research Group). Id. at 505 nn.2-4.
3. Greenhouse gases are generally associated with carbon dioxide, as carbon
dioxide, or CO2, is emitted in the greatest quantity of all greenhouse gases.
MICHAEL GERRARD ET AL., GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 5 (Michael Ger-
rard ed., 2007).  Other greenhouse gases include methane; nitrous oxide; sulfur
hexafluoride; and assorted hydro- and perfluorocarbons. Id.  Each of these other
739
1
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Clean Air Act.4  The EPA was supported by ten intervening
states5 and various trade associations.6
In the 5-4 decision, Justice Stevens’s opinion of the Court
went to great lengths to explicate the scientific underpinnings
of climate change.  He began in 1959, when the U.S. Weather
Bureau started monitoring atmospheric CO2 levels in Mauna
Loa, Hawaii, and his opinion relied primarily upon the periodic
reports issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”).7  For instance, in 1990, the IPCC released its
first climate change report, which “concluded that ‘emissions re-
sulting from human activities are substantially increasing the
atmospheric concentrations of . . . greenhouse gases [which] will
enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an addi-
tional warming of the Earth’s surface.’”8  In 1995, the IPCC re-
leased its second climate change report, “concluding that ‘[t]he
balance of evidence suggests there is a discernible human influ-
ence on global climate.’”9  Justice Stevens cited the 2001 IPCC
report to put the concentration of atmospheric CO2 in a histori-
cal context.10  The Court went on to find that the petitioners had
greenhouse gases, pound for pound, poses a greater threat to climate change than
does carbon dioxide, as each exhibit a greater heat-trapping capacity in the atmos-
phere. Id.  These can be converted into a standard unit, measuring “global warm-
ing potential” or “GWP.” Id.  One ton of carbon dioxide emitted has a GWP of 1,
while one ton of methane has a GWP of 23, and one ton of sulfur hexafluoride has a
GWP of 22,200. Id. (internal citation omitted).  This Comment, while using the
terms “carbon dioxide,” “CO2,” and “greenhouse gas(es)” interchangeably, assumes
that greenhouse gas emissions regulation would apply not only to carbon dioxide,
but to all greenhouse gases based on their relative climate change characteristics
measured using GWP or something similar.
4. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7571(q) (2006).
5. Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, Texas, and Utah. Massachusetts, 497 U.S. at 505 n.5.
6. These trade associations included the Alliance of Automobile Manufactur-
ers, the National Automobile Dealers Association, the Engine Manufacturers Asso-
ciation, the Truck Manufacturers Association, the CO2 Litigation Group, and the
Utility Air Regulatory Group. Id. at 505 n.6.
7. Id. at 507-11.
8. Id. at 508-09 (quoting INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
[IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, at xi (J.T. Houghton
et al. eds., 1990)).
9. Id. at 509 (quoting IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 4 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1996)).
10. Id. at 507 n.9 (citing IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT
202-03 (Robert Watson et al. eds., 2001) (“By drilling through thick Antarctic ice
sheets and extracting ‘cores,’ scientists can examine ice from long ago and extract
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/4
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standing to bring their suit and that carbon dioxide is an air
pollutant within the meaning of the Clean Air Act, which the
EPA must either regulate or provide a reason for declining to
regulate.11
The scientific background in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Massachusetts v. EPA lends immediate credibility to the cli-
mate change phenomenon, and will surely be cited in future liti-
gation waged over greenhouse gas emissions.  Individual states,
which have been active in the climate change arena for years,
are further buoyed by the recent decision that seems to redeem
their foresight.  Some states have considered passing legislation
that would tax greenhouse gas emissions to make pollution
more expensive, thereby giving these polluters an economic in-
centive to reduce emissions.12  Many other states have decided
to address climate change through regional market-based trad-
ing systems where polluters would be allowed to trade CO2 al-
lowances amongst themselves.13  In a cap-and-trade system, an
individual polluter would weigh the cost of reducing emissions
against keeping emissions constant and buying allowances on
an open market to continue polluting; an economically rational
small samples of ancient air.  That air can then be analyzed, yielding estimates of
carbon dioxide levels.”)).  See also id. at 507 n.10 (“In 2006, carbon dioxide levels
reached 382 parts per million . . . [which is believed] to exceed the concentration of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at any point over the past 20-million years.” (cit-
ing IPCC, TECHNICAL SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP I REPORT 39 (F. Joos et al.
eds., 2001))).
11. Id. at 528 (“[T]he first question is whether § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act
authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in
the event that it forms a ‘judgment’ that such emissions contribute to climate
change.  We have little trouble concluding that it does.”).
12. Frank Muller & J. Andrew Hoerner, Greening State Energy Taxes: Carbon
Taxes for Revenue and the Environment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 5, 44-56 (1994)
(citing 1992 Md. S.B. 665; Briefing on Proposed Air Pollution Tax Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means (Mar. 12, 1992) (on file with the PACE ENVTL. L. REV.)
(Maryland legislation that would have imposed a carbon tax of $7.50 per ton of
emissions); Cal. A.B. 1725 (as amended May 5, 1993); Cal. Assem. Comm. on Reve-
nue and Taxation, Memorandum on A.B. 1725 (May 10, 1993) (California legisla-
tion that would have imposed a carbon tax of $3 per ton of emissions); 1992 Minn.
H.F. 3054 and 1992 Minn. S.F. 2803 (Minnesota legislation that would have im-
posed a carbon tax of $6 per ton of emissions)).
13. See Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, http://www.midwestern
accord.org/ (participants include Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin); Western Climate Initiative, https://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/
WCI_Documents.cfm (participants include Arizona, California, Montana, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington). See also discussion infra Part II.
3
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company would choose the option that maximized profits and
minimized costs.
The prescience of New York State, a plaintiff in Massachu-
setts v. EPA, is evident in the state’s desire to address climate
change.  At the state level, the two methods of combating cli-
mate change that are most commonly discussed are regulation
via a tax and regulation via a market-based trading system.
Federal regulation would seem to eliminate many of the legal
hurdles present in state regulation, but in the absence of such
federal regulation, states that want to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions must be aware of the legal obstacles confronting leg-
islative action.
State regulation of greenhouse gas emissions presents
unique constitutional questions that must be addressed.  This
Comment will examine these constitutional issues from the per-
spective of a legislative aide in the New York State legislature.
First, legal questions surrounding regulation via a carbon tax
will be addressed.  Second, the legal questions surrounding reg-
ulation via a market-based trading system will be discussed.
Third, the merits of each method of regulation will be compared,
and an overview of the economic ramifications of each will be
incorporated to ultimately make a solid policy recommendation.
I. Carbon Tax
Under our federalist system, states have the power to tax
items produced within their borders.  New York would be per-
mitted to put a tax on carbon used within the state, just as it is
allowed to impose a sales tax on goods purchased within the
state.
A carbon tax would be based on the amount of carbon con-
tained in a type of fuel and would be “proportional to the carbon
dioxide emissions associated with each fuel.”14  It would de-
crease greenhouse gas emissions in two ways.15  First, by in-
creasing the price of energy, a carbon tax would encourage
consumers to use energy more efficiently.16 Second, it would en-
14. Muller & Hoerner, supra note 12, at 8.
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id.  For example, a manufacturing company that uses a high amount of
energy in making a product would be willing to invest capital in streamlining its
production process to use less energy.  Non-energy-intensive businesses in the ser-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/4
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courage consumers to purchase less carbon-based energy and
more energy from renewable sources that are not subject to the
carbon tax.17
A state carbon tax would not seem to be precluded by the
possible imposition of a federal carbon tax.18  Both states and
the Federal Government could impose their own carbon taxes,
structured like the federal/state dichotomy in the gasoline tax
model of taxation.19
It is important to decide how the carbon tax would be ad-
ministered.  There are two possible means of administering the
tax.20  One, a “carbon emissions tax,” would tax “energy . . . con-
sumed in the state, regardless of whether goods produced with
that energy are consumed in-state or out-of-state.”21  This car-
bon emissions tax would tax carbon-based “fuels directly con-
sumed and used to produce electricity consumed in the state.”22
A carbon emissions tax would only tax fuels, not goods produced
using carbon-based fuels.23  The second type of tax is a “carbon
consumption tax.”  This method would tax carbon-based “energy
sold to households in the state or used to produce goods con-
sumed in the state,”24 and would tax goods that are produced
using carbon-based fuels, including carbon-based fuels them-
selves.25  The biggest difference in the two tax bases lies in their
treatment of goods that cross state lines in the stream of com-
merce.26  A carbon consumption tax base, by its definition,
vice industry would be willing to invest in energy-saving measures affecting fixed
costs, such as replacing incandescent light bulbs with light emitting diode (LED)
light bulbs, or installing more efficient heating and cooling systems.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id. Currently, there is a wide range in the amount of tax levied by states
on gasoline.  Courts have been unwilling to find state gasoline taxes preempted by
the federal gasoline tax because Congress has not done so explicitly. See Rachel L.
Chanin, California’s Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699, 752 n.263 (2003).







If the tax base is energy used to produce goods consumed in a state [a carbon
consumption tax], then manufacturers of exported goods should receive a
5
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would include goods made out-of-state that are imported into a
state; a carbon emissions tax base by its definition would only
include energy consumed in the state and would not impinge on
interstate commerce.
Administering a tax that would best address greenhouse
gas emissions may run afoul of certain constitutional provi-
sions.  This potential conflict is similar to the problem, dis-
cussed below, regarding leakage in a market based system.27
Under a carbon consumption tax system, products imported
from out-of-state whose production emits greenhouse gases
should be taxed so that similar domestic products are not at a
competitive disadvantage.28  This process raises a constitutional
question under the Commerce Clause.29
A. Commerce Clause
While the Commerce Clause is phrased affirmatively,
courts have also found that a Dormant Commerce Clause is im-
plied within the text, which prohibits state action from burden-
ing interstate commerce.30  The idea of a Dormant or Negative
Commerce Clause finds its roots in early Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence.  In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall
hints at the idea of a Dormant Commerce Clause by discussing
the dual taxing ability of the Federal Government.31  Justice
Johnson, in concurrence, states that the ability to regulate in-
terstate commerce can only reside with the Federal Govern-
ment, to the exclusion of the states.32  More recently, in
credit for carbon taxes paid on energy used to produce those goods, while
importers of goods into the state should pay a tax based on the energy used
to produce the imports.  If the base is emissions from energy consumed in
the state [a carbon emissions tax], neither imports nor exports would receive
any special treatment.
Id.
27. See discussion infra Part II.
28. Muller & Hoerner, supra note 12, at 26.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes”).
30. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
31. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
32. Id. at 89 (“[T]he power must be exclusive; it can reside but in one poten-
tate; and hence, the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving
nothing for the State to act upon.”).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/4
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Henneford v. Silas Mason, the Supreme Court approved of a
Washington state sales tax plan that would credit items sold in
Washington for sales taxes paid in other states so as to equalize
the tax on all products.33
B. The Compensatory Tax Doctrine
Under the Commerce Clause, a state may tax items in the
stream of commerce when it taxes the same items within its
own borders, ensuring that foreign items are not at a competi-
tive advantage relative to in-state items.34  Under Silas Mason,
a carbon emissions tax would not raise any constitutional is-
sues, as the tax is confined to intrastate activities.35  Energy
sold in the state, either imported or produced within the state,
would be taxed, while energy produced in the state but sold in a
different state would receive a credit against the tax.36
A carbon consumption tax could potentially interfere with
the Commerce Clause because a state would be taxing two dif-
ferent goods.37  A carbon consumption tax would impose a tax
on all products being imported into a state that were produced
using a carbon-based fuel; the corresponding in-state tax would
not apply to products, but to the fuel used to make the prod-
ucts.38  Thus, a state, for purposes of the compensatory tax doc-
33. 300 U.S. 577, 584 (1937).
34. Muller & Hoerner, supra note 12, at 35. See also, Heddy Bolster, Note,
The Commerce Clause Meets Environmental Protection: The Compensatory Tax
Doctrine as a Defense of Potential Regional Carbon Dioxide Regulation, 47 B.C. L.
REV. 737 (2006).
35. Muller & Hoerner, supra note 12, at 35.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. One might question why a state, to avoid any constitutional problems,
could not simply match the tax base: in-state fuel and out-of-state fuel, or in-state
goods and out-of-state goods.  With regard to taxing the in-state good, it would be
much simpler for a state to simply tax the input (the fuel) rather than the output
(the product).  This avoids forcing the state to tax the large number of products
that are made using carbon-based energy and allows the state to tax one item: the
fuel.  However, a state cannot match this tax on out-of-state fuel used to produce a
good because the fuel is used entirely within another state.  State A, for example,
does not have the ability to tax actions occurring entirely within State B.  But,
State A does have the ability to tax products coming from State B into State A
based on the amount of carbon emitted in producing the product.  Thus, a carbon
consumption tax would tax fuel used to produce goods in State A and products
from State B that are sold in State A.  As State A’s domestic tax base does not
correspond to its foreign tax base, there is a potential Commerce Clause problem.
7
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trine, would be taxing two different items: imported products
and domestic fuels.  This dual taxation is generally prohibited
by the Commerce Clause.  Nonetheless, this tax system may
still survive a constitutional challenge.39
In Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, the Supreme Court applied its
three-part test, as described below, to determine whether an in-
tangibles tax survives a challenge under the Commerce
Clause.40
1. Identifying the Intrastate Burden
Under the first prong of the Fulton test, a state “must iden-
tify the intrastate tax for which it seeks to compensate.”41  “[I]t
should go without saying that this intrastate tax must serve
some purpose for which the State may otherwise impose a bur-
den on interstate commerce.”42  The Fulton Court cites Mary-
land v. Louisiana for the proposition that Louisiana lacked a
“sovereign interest” in resources extracted outside its borders
and hence was unable to burden interstate commerce based on
this purpose.43  That holding is troubling, as a carbon tax,
whether in the form of a carbon consumption tax or carbon
emissions tax, implicates similar environmental concerns.
There are differences, however, between the facts sur-
rounding Louisiana and a potential carbon tax challenge. Loui-
siana dealt with the extraction of natural gas that was later
imported into the state of Louisiana.44  While the taxation of
natural gas imports is similar to the taxation of carbon, there is
an important difference: for a carbon tax, there is a public
health aspect that is not present in the interstate sale of natu-
ral gas.45  Moreover, the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, in find-
ing standing for the Petitioners, was clear in asserting that
states have a sovereign interest “in all the earth and air within
its domain” and hence in greenhouse gas emissions by other
39. Id. at 35-36.
40. 516 U.S. 325, 334-44 (1996). See generally infra notes 88-120 and accom-
panying text.
41. 516 U.S. at 334.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759 (1981)).
44. 451 U.S. at 728-30.
45. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/4
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states.46  Thus, a court may be willing to find that a state does
have a sovereign interest over foreign greenhouse gas emissions
for public health reasons, and thus may decide that this is a
permissible activity on which to impose a tax.
2. The Interstate Burden in Relation to the Intrastate
Burden
Under the second prong of the Fulton test, “the tax on inter-
state commerce [must] be shown roughly to approximate—but
not exceed—the amount of the tax on intrastate commerce.”47
With respect to a carbon consumption tax, there may be a bur-
den on interstate commerce.  Indeed, a carbon consumption tax
would facially discriminate against interstate commerce, as
goods produced out-of-state would be subject to a tax based on
the amount of energy used to produce the good.  However, under
a carbon consumption tax, goods produced in-state would also
be subject to a tax based on the amount of energy used to pro-
duce the good.  In theory, the burden should be equal: the same
good produced using the same amount of energy, no matter its
origin, should be subject to the same tax burden.
A problem arises, however, when a state imposing a carbon
consumption tax attempts to determine the amount of tax that
should be levied.  It is much easier for a state to monitor energy
consumption within its borders.  A state will not be able to mea-
sure the energy used in other states.  Thus, the challenge will
be determining the correct level of taxation for imported goods.
It will be important for states that adopt a carbon consumption
tax to measure energy consumption for imported and domestic
goods using the same method.  There is a similar problem facing
a taxation system addressing leakage, as discussed below.48
While this method will result in less precise taxation for domes-
tic goods, it may save the tax from failing the second prong of
the Fulton test.
46. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518-19 (2007) (quoting Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
47. 516 U.S. at 336 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
48. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
9
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3. Substantially Similar
Under the third prong of the Fulton test, the tax must “fall
on substantially [similar] events.”49  In Fulton, the Court notes
that it has been reluctant to find equivalence, the taxing of sim-
ilar events, outside of the sales tax arena, and has prohibited
compensatory taxes on income, waste, and natural resources.50
The challenge for a state enacting a carbon consumption tax
will be overcoming the Supreme Court’s historical tendency to
proscribe compensatory taxes outside of the sales tax arena.  An
equivalence finding requires “that the actual incidences of the
two tax burdens are different enough from their nominal inci-
dences so that the real taxpayers are within the same class.”51
As discussed below with respect to leakage, the Supreme
Court, in striking down allegedly compensatory taxes for failing
this equivalence test, has always done so where the intrastate
and interstate burdens were unequal.52  A state enacting a car-
bon consumption tax would be wise to make sure that the bur-
dens are equal by creating a tax credit for any businesses that
are subject to some other kind of carbon regulation, such as a
regional market-based system or another state’s carbon tax.
This approach would ensure that burdens would remain equal,
and may be the best chance to save the carbon tax.
C. Conclusion
A state imposing a carbon consumption tax has a good
chance to survive scrutiny under the Commerce Clause and the
recent compensatory tax doctrine jurisprudence.53  It may be
able to meet Fulton’s first prong, where a proper interstate bur-
den is identified, by using the recent Massachusetts v. EPA deci-
sion.  The second prong may be met by creating a tax that
closely estimates greenhouse gas emissions from the imported
product and applies the same method to domestic products.
This type of tax will sacrifice precision in measuring emissions
49. 516 U.S. at 338 (internal quotations omitted).
50. Id. at 338-39 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
51. Id. at 340.
52. See infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
53. For a comprehensive analysis of a state carbon tax under the compensa-
tory tax doctrine using a modern but older Supreme Court case, see generally
Muller & Hoerner, supra note 12.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/4
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from domestic products, but will help to satisfy the second
prong.  Last, a state may meet the final prong by ensuring that
the tax burdens are equal, by providing tax credits for imported
products that were already subject to similar regulation during
the stream of commerce.  While satisfaction of these steps does
not guarantee a finding of constitutionality, it seems to be in
line with recent applications of the compensatory tax doctrine.
II. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) is a coali-
tion of ten Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic States committed to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions using a cap-and-trade sys-
tem.  The signatory states include Connecticut, Delaware,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont (the “signatory
states” or “participating states”).54
RGGI’s goal is the creation of a “CO2 Budget Trading Pro-
gram . . . aimed at stabilizing and then reducing CO2 emissions
within the Signatory States, and implementing a regional CO2
emissions budget and allowance trading program that will reg-
ulate CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel-fired electricity generating
units having a rated capacity equal to or greater than 25 mega-
watts.”55  The annual cap on CO2 emissions, which began on
January 1, 2009, will be 188,076,976 tons.56  New York State’s
emission budget allocation is 64,310,805 tons of CO2.57  Begin-
54. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE: SECOND AMENDMENT TO MEMO-
RANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 1 (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://rggi.org/docs/
mou_second_amend.pdf [hereinafter RGGI: SECOND AMENDMENT].
55. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
2 (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf [herein-
after RGGI: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING]. See also Tseming Yang, The Prob-
lem of Maintaining Emission “Caps” in Carbon Trading Programs Without Federal
Government Involvement: A Brief Examination of the Chicago Climate Exchange
and the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
271, 282 (2006).
56. RGGI: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 55, at 2, 8 (this in-
cludes an original CO2 cap of 121,253,550 tons combined with the emissions budg-
ets of Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island once they became signatory
states to the Memorandum of Understanding). See also RGGI: SECOND AMEND-
MENT, supra note 54, at 1.
57. RGGI: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 55, at 3.  The com-
plete breakdown, in tons of CO2 emissions, is as follows: New York– 64,310,805;
Maryland – 37,503,983; Massachusetts – 26,660,204; New Jersey – 22,892,730;
11
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ning in 2015, each state’s individual cap will decrease by 2.5%
per year, so that in 2018, the overall cap will have decreased by
10%.58
The Memorandum of Understanding contemplates, among
other things, a compliance period of a minimum of three years;59
a safety valve trigger;60 and an opportunity to purchase offsets
in lieu of allowances.61  RGGI is to be administered by a re-
gional organization, which will become a non-profit entity lo-
cated in New York City and will operate pursuant to bylaws
ratified by the signatory states.62  This regional organization
will act as a forum for discussion, track emissions and al-
lowances, and develop new standards for offsets.63  However,
the regional organization is “a technical assistance organization
only [and] shall have no regulatory or enforcement authority
with respect to the CO2 Budget Trading Program, and such au-
thority is reserved to each Signatory State for the implementa-
tion of its rule.”64
Each signatory state will implement the Model Rule estab-
lishing the parameters of the CO2 trading system.65  As de-
scribed in the Memorandum of Understanding, the Model Rule
will “serve as the framework for the creation of necessary statu-
Connecticut – 10,695,036; New Hampshire – 8,620,460; Delaware – 7,559,787;
Maine – 5,948,902; Rhode Island – 2,659,239; Vermont – 1,225,830.  See id. at 3, 8.
See also RGGI: SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 54, at 1.
58. RGGI: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 55, at 3.
59. Id. (the compliance period is the period of time at the end of which each
state must possess sufficient CO2 allowances to cover their emissions during the
preceding compliance period that has just ended).
60. Id. (this would extend the compliance period if the market price for 1 ton
of CO2 exceeds $10, measured in 2005 dollars).
61. Id. at 4 (offsets must be “real, surplus, verifiable, permanent and enforcea-
ble;” initially, offsets will consist of “landfill gas (methane) capture and combus-
tion; sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) capture and recycling; afforestation . . . ; end-use
efficiency for natural gas, propane and heating oil; methane capture from farming
operations; and projects to reduce fugitive methane emissions from natural gas
transmission and distribution.”  Lastly, there are geographical limitations on the
use of offsets.).
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 7-8.
64. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
65. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MODEL RULE 1 (Jan. 5, 2007),
available at http://rggi.org/docs/model_rule_corrected_1_5_07.pdf [hereinafter
RGGI: MODEL RULE].
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tory and/or regulatory authority to establish the Program.”66
The Model Rule is organized as follows: CO2 Budget Trading
Program General Provisions; Authorized Account Representa-
tive for CO2 Budget Sources; Permits; Compliance Certification;
CO2 Allowance Allocations; CO2 Allowance Tracking System;
CO2 Allowance Transfers; Monitoring and Reporting; and CO2
Emissions Offset Projects.67  Of particular importance is its en-
forcement mechanism.  Under the Model Rule, each signatory
state shall oversee its own CO2 emission budget allocation by
regulating individual power plants within the signatory state.68
Thus, each state will be responsible for enforcing the CO2 trad-
ing system within its own borders and penalizing its own indi-
vidual power plants that have not purchased sufficient CO2
allowances for the preceding compliance period.  However, the
Model Rule is only designed to be enforced on a state-by-state
basis, and does not address how the regional CO2 cap will be
maintained in the event that a signatory state exceeds its indi-
vidual emissions budget allocation.69  For reasons discussed be-
low, RGGI does not allow the regional organization to enforce
the total regional CO2 cap.70
A. Constitutional Constraints of RGGI - The Compact Clause
The regional organization was not given the ability to en-
force the regional CO2 cap in order to avoid falling within the
prohibition of the Compact Clause of the United States Consti-
tution.71  In Virginia v. Tennessee, an early case interpreting the
66. RGGI: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 55, at 6-7.
67. RGGI: MODEL RULE art. XX.
68. Id. at art. XX-6.5 (under the Model Rule, art. XX-6.5(d), a signatory state’s
regulatory agency will have the authority to deduct from a power plant who does
not have a sufficient number of CO2 allowances to cover its emissions from the
previous compliance period three times the number of allowances necessary to
cover these emissions from its compliance account; in the event that the power
plant does not have a sufficient number of allowances in its compliance account,
the regulatory agency will assess “fines, penalties, or other obligations” against the
power plant).
69. Yang, supra note 55, at 284.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the con-
sent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops or Ships of War in time of
peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as
will not admit of delay.”) (emphasis added)).
13
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meaning of the Compact Clause, the Supreme Court declined to
declare null and void acts by two state legislatures establishing
the boundary between each state.72  The Supreme Court de-
clared that not all compacts or agreements between states need
the prior or subsequent approval of Congress.73  Only compacts
or agreements “directed to the formation of any combination
tending to the increase of political power in the states, which
may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the
United States” are proscribed.74  The Compact Clause applies
not only to formal agreements, but to informal agreements as
well.75  According to United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Commission, “[t]he relevant inquiry must be one of impact on
our federal structure.”76
It is unclear whether RGGI has avoided creating an inter-
state compact proscribed by the Constitution.77  The facts sur-
rounding the compact at issue in Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are analogous
to those surrounding RGGI.78  Northeast Bancorp challenged
the Federal Reserve Board’s approval of three bank holding
companies’ acquisition of banks within New England but
outside the state in which each bank holding company was prin-
cipally located.79  Northeast Bancorp alleged, among other
things, that the statutes enabling these acquisitions violated
72. 148 U.S. 503 (1893).  Virginia and Tennessee’s legislatures each passed
acts establishing the boundary between the two states, but Virginia would later
seek to have the Supreme Court declare null and void these pieces of legislation
using the Compact Clause.
73. Id. at 518 (For example, the Court reasons that two states should, without
approval of Congress, be permitted to unite to fight a disease afflicting each state.).
74. Id. at 519 (The Court comes to this conclusion by applying a rule of statu-
tory construction, noscitur a sociis, where it interprets the meaning of “agreement
or compact” by reference to the surrounding words; thus, based on the entire
clause, the Court concludes that an “agreement or compact” between States is pro-
hibited where the “agreement or compact” relates to “the exercise of political
sovereignty.”).
75. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1978)
(“The Clause reaches both agreements and compacts, the formal as well as the
informal.”) (internal quotations omitted).
76. Id. at 471.
77. Yang, supra note 55, at 284.
78. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472
U.S. 159 (1985).
79. Id. at 162.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/4
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the Compact Clause.80  The Supreme Court found that no com-
pact had been formed, stating that the “classic indicia of a com-
pact [were] missing.”81  In addition, the Supreme Court found
that the state statutes did not “either enhance the political
power of the New England States at the expense of other States
or have an ‘impact on our federal structure.’”82
RGGI, in drafting its Model Rule and creating its regional
organization, seems to have heeded the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Northeast Bancorp, Inc.83  While RGGI has created a re-
gional organization, this body has no enforcement powers.  Any
excess emissions by a power plant are dealt with by state regu-
latory agencies.  The Model Rule’s implementation within a par-
ticular signatory state is not conditioned upon its adoption by
any other signatory states.  Each state may amend or repeal the
Model Rule, and the Model Rule does not require reciprocal ac-
tion in the event that the regional CO2 cap is exceeded.
However, there are important differences between the
banking statutes approved by the Supreme Court in Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. and RGGI.84  The Bush Administration refused to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and considered itself powerless to reg-
ulate CO2 emissions.85  Though the Obama Administration is al-
ready breaking from the previous administration’s carbon
policy, the extent to which the Federal Government will regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions is still an open question.  No
matter what track the new administration takes, RGGI may be
considered to be an attempt to circumvent the Federal Govern-
ment’s carbon dioxide policy.86  A court could find that RGGI is
an interstate compact designed to “increase . . . the political
80. Id.
81. Id. at 175 (“No joint organization or body has been established to regulate
regional banking or for any other purpose.  Neither statute is conditioned on action
by the other State, and each State is free to modify or repeal its law unilaterally
. . . neither statute requires a reciprocation of the regional limitation.”).
82. Id. at 176 (quoting U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 471) (emphasis in
original).
83. Yang, supra note 55, at 285.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Memorandum by Robert F. Fabricant, EPA’s Authority to Im-
pose Mandatory Controls to Address Global Climate Change under the Clean Air
Act (Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://198.65.255.217/hselaw/pdf/Fabricantmemo.
pdf).
86. Yang, supra note 55, at 285.
15
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power or influence of the States affected, and thus encroach . . .
upon the full and free exercise of Federal authority,”87 thus fall-
ing within the purview of the Compact Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
B. Constitutional Constraints of RGGI - The Commerce
Clause
RGGI must also avoid falling within the U.S. Constitution’s
Commerce Clause.88  Of consequence to RGGI are statutes that
facially discriminate against out-of-state interests.89  In order to
combat leakage, RGGI may want to amend its Model Rule to
allow states to tax electricity purchased outside of RGGI’s geo-
graphical region by suppliers within RGGI’s geographical re-
gion so that power plants within RGGI’s geographical region
can remain competitive.90  One possible means of doing this, in
the context of a market-based system of regulation, is by mak-
ing polluters within the region responsible for any electricity
that they import, as opposed to that which they manufacture on
site.91  As described above, the Supreme Court has found
facially discriminatory regulation per se invalid; it can only be
overcome with a showing “that the regulation advances a legiti-
mate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reason-
able non-discriminatory alternatives.”92
87. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893).
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[t]he Congress shall have power . . . [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes”); Bolster, supra note 34, at 738-39 (internal citations omitted).
See discussion supra Part I.A.
89. Bolster, supra note 34, at 749.
90. Leakage can be defined as “the potential problem that electricity gener-
ated in neighboring non-RGGI states may be cheaper at times than that generated
in RGGI states, whether as a result of RGGI-related costs or other factors.” GER-
RARD ET AL., supra note 3, at 335.  “If this energy is imported into RGGI states, it
could underbid the RGGI-state, lower-emission generation and make it difficult for
generators functioning under RGGI restrictions to compete effectively.” Id. at 335-
36.
91. Bolster, supra note 34, at 747 (citing Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Com-
merce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Elec-
tricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 250-52 (1999)).
92. Bolster, supra note 34, at 748 (citing Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
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The modern compensatory tax doctrine is set out in Fulton
Corp. v. Faulkner.93  The Fulton Court found a North Carolina
state “intangibles tax”94 on corporate stock owned by state re-
sidents to violate the Commerce Clause.  The Court found that
the tax discriminated against interstate commerce on its face,
but noted that under certain circumstances a facially discrimi-
natory tax may still survive a challenge under the Commerce
Clause.95  The three compensatory factors identified are: (1) as a
threshold question, what intrastate burden is the tax attempt-
ing to compensate for?; (2) whether the tax on interstate com-
merce “roughly [ ] approximate[s]” but does not exceed the tax
on intrastate commerce; and (3) whether the activities upon
which the taxes are levied are “substantially [similar].”96
The three-part test under the compensatory doctrine can be
applied to a system of leakage regulations under RGGI to pre-
serve constitutionality.97
1. Identifying the Intrastate Burden
Under Fulton, states “must identify the intrastate burden
for which the regulation of emissions associated with electricity
imports seeks to compensate.”98  The intrastate burden that
states would identify is the burden borne by in-state electricity
producers who would be undercut by imports not subject to car-
bon emission regulations.99  This threshold matter may or may
93. 516 U.S. 325. See also Bolster, supra note 34, at 756.
94. The “intangibles tax” was equal to one quarter of one percent (.25% or
.0025) of the fair market value of the particular corporation. Fulton, 516 U.S. at
327-28.  The tax applied to North Carolina residents based on the amount of busi-
ness the corporation did within the state; for example, resident owners of stock in a
corporation doing no business within the state would be able to deduct 0% of the
“intangibles tax,” while resident owners of stock in a corporation doing business
entirely within the state would be able to deduct 100% of the “intangibles tax.” Id.
at 328.  If, for example, a corporation did 65% of its business within the state,
residents owning stock in the corporation would be able to deduct 35% of the “in-
tangibles tax.” Id.  A North Carolina corporation subject to the tax due to the com-
position of its stock portfolio claimed that it violated the Commerce Clause by
giving residents an unconstitutional incentive to buy stock in North Carolina cor-
porations doing substantial business within the state. Id. at 329.
95. Id. at 331 (quoting Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647
(1994)).
96. Id. at 332-33 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
97. Bolster, supra note 34, at 763-70.
98. Id. at 763.
99. Id.
17
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not be satisfied depending upon a court’s interpretation of Loui-
siana and Fulton, and their applications to RGGI.100  In Louisi-
ana, the Court found that Louisiana did not have an interest in
resources outside of the state.101  Similarly, here, states would
be attempting to regulate resources outside of their borders.102
Unlike Louisiana and Fulton, where no legitimate in-state in-
terest was found, participating states do have a legitimate in-
terest in their own public health and natural resources.103  It is
argued that by identifying a legitimate in-state interest, and
stating that regulations affecting both in-state and out-of-state
interests are necessary to protect the in-state interest, partici-
pating states may be able to survive the first prong of the com-
pensatory tax doctrine test.104
2. The Interstate Burden in Relation to the Intrastate
Burden
The second prong of the compensatory tax doctrine “re-
quires that the burden on interstate commerce roughly approxi-
mate, but not exceed, the burden on intrastate commerce.”105
Two issues likely to arise include the method by which al-
lowances are distributed and the method by which emissions
will be measured.106  Depending on the way RGGI treats these
issues, the burden on interstate and intrastate commerce could
be very different.  This in turn could be the difference between
the Supreme Court finding the RGGI regulations constitutional
or not.  To avoid inequality, one can “set the cap . . . at a level
that includes the emissions associated with historic imports on
the same basis as historic in-region generation;”107 or, use a
common method of measuring CO2 emissions for both in-state
and out-of-state emissions, rather than measuring in-state
emissions and estimating out-of-state emissions based on elec-
100. Id. at 764-65 (citing Fulton, 516 U.S. 325; Louisiana v. Maryland, 451
U.S. 725 (1981)).
101. Id. at 764 (citing Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725).
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Fulton, 516 U.S. 325; Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725).
104. Id. at 764-65.
105. Id. at 765.
106. Id. at 766.
107. Id.
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tricity output.108  A combination of setting a cap that considers
emissions of imports, and not only emissions from domestic
sources, with a common method of measuring in-state and out-
of-state emissions, may be RGGI’s best chance to satisfy this
prong.
3. Substantially Similar
Lastly, the participating states would need to “show that
the events on which the interstate and intrastate burdens fall
are substantially equivalent; that is, they are sufficiently simi-
lar in substances to serve as mutually exclusive proxies for each
other.”109  Participating states should be prepared to show that
emissions associated with imported and domestically produced
electricity are “functionally equivalent.”110  In Louisiana, the
Court struck down a tax because goods were burdened differ-
ently depending on whether they were destined for in-state or
out-of-state consumption.111  Unlike Louisiana, the participat-
ing states would be attempting to ensure uniformity in how in-
state electricity consumption is taxed.112  In addition, the tax
burden for in-state and out-of-state electricity would fall on the
same taxpayers, in-state electricity generators, and ultimately,
consumers, thus assuring uniformity.113
The Supreme Court has been reticent to approve of facially
discriminatory taxes, and has not done so outside of sale and
use taxes since 1937.114  This is often because “[c]ourts will ordi-
narily be unable to evaluate the economic equivalence of alleg-
edly complementary tax schemes that go beyond traditional
sales/use taxes.”115  However, the RGGI regulation of carbon
emissions from imported electricity may still be saved.  In the
cases since 1937 where the Court has voided taxes that it found
failed the compensatory tax analysis, the Court found in each
case that regulations had the ultimate effect of favoring domes-
108. Id.
109. Id. at 767-68 (internal citation omitted).
110. Id. at 768 (internal citation omitted).
111. Id. (citing Louisiana v. Maryland, 451 U.S. 725, 756, 758-60 (1981)).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996)).
114. Id. at 769 (citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)).
115. Id. (quoting Fulton, 516 U.S. 325, 342 n.8).
19
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tic entities.116  Here, in theory, the burden would be equal.117
One option is to create exceptions in the form of tax credits to
ensure that the burden remains equal in the event that foreign
entities are subject to another type of carbon regulation that
would put them at a competitive disadvantage with respect to
domestic producers.118
C. Conclusion
Just as a state carbon tax may be able to use the compensa-
tory doctrine to avoid being proscribed by the Commerce
Clause, RGGI may be able to do the same when creating regula-
tions intended to combat leakage.  RGGI may have also saved
itself from a potential finding of unconstitutionality under the
Compact Clause by vesting no enforcement powers with the re-
gional body, and by leaving the individual states to punish pol-
luters within their own borders.
III. Conclusion: Policy Implications
There may be some overlap between the constitutional is-
sues that arise under a carbon tax and under a market-based
system.  With a carbon tax, the compensatory tax doctrine will
necessarily arise.  A carbon tax will not be successful unless a
state is able to tax carbon emissions from goods produced out-
of-state.  A tax levied only upon goods produced within a state
that emit greenhouse gases will only succeed in undercutting
the businesses that are affected, to the benefit of foreign busi-
nesses that will be able to enter the market without the burden
of a carbon tax, and hence, at a competitive advantage.  Only by
equalizing the two can a state start to meaningfully put a price
on carbon emissions, and thereby give producers, and consum-
ers, an incentive to pollute less.  By taxing both in-state and
out-of-state carbon emissions under the compensatory tax doc-
trine, there is little opportunity for out-of-state businesses to
undercut in-state businesses.
116. Id. at 769-70 (citing Fulton, 516 U.S. at 343; Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 106 (1994); Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S.
638, 644 (1984); Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 759).
117. Id. at 769.
118. Id.
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The constitutional infirmity with the carbon tax is its po-
tential burden on interstate commerce.  Under the compensa-
tory tax doctrine, this infirmity can be cured.  A properly
administered carbon tax must meet the Supreme Court’s three-
part test set forth in Fulton in order to pass constitutional mus-
ter.119  As discussed, a state should be able to structure both a
carbon emissions tax and a carbon consumption tax to meet the
compensatory tax doctrine and avoid running afoul of the Com-
merce Clause.
A market-based system of carbon regulation, such as RGGI,
would function differently than a carbon tax.  Theoretically,
under a market-based system, the public benefit of greenhouse
gas emission abatement can be maximized by keeping the cost
of compliance with emissions regulations at a minimum.  This
is because the cost of emission reduction will not be constant
across all of the regulated industry.  Company A may be able to
reduce emissions at a cost of $10/ton of CO2 abated.  Company B
may be able to do so more cheaply for a variety of reasons, such
as easier access to capital or more modern facilities that can be
more readily retrofitted.  Under a market-based system, where
there is a cap on emissions that the regulated public must abide
by, companies will be forced to reduce emissions either by pol-
luting less or buying credits that are traded on an open market.
Company B would likely cut emissions more than is necessary
under the cap if it could sell credits on the market for more than
the cost of emission reduction.  Company A would buy credits on
the open market if the cost of purchasing credits is less than the
cost of reducing emissions.
Like a carbon tax, market-based systems present their own
constitutional problems when enacted at a state, rather than
the federal, level.  New York State is already participating in a
regional trading program called RGGI, discussed in Part II
above.  The regional program, which includes New York as well
as other Mid-Atlantic, Northeastern, and New England states,
must ensure that it does not fall within the Compact Clause of
the Constitution.  This provision of the Constitution forbids
states from entering into “any agreement or compact with an-
119. See Fulton, 516 U.S. 325 (requiring the identification of the interstate
burden, the equivalence of the interstate burden and the intrastate burden, and
substantial similarity).
21
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other State” without the permission of Congress.120  While
phrased broadly, the clause has been interpreted to mean that
states cannot enter into agreements with one another that tend
to increase the power of the states vis-a`-vis the Federal Govern-
ment.121  A court could conceivably find that, in light of the Fed-
eral Government’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions, state regulation of emissions would tend to increase
the power of the states as compared to the Federal Government.
Conversely, a court could just as easily find that, because the
Federal Government would still be free to create a national reg-
ulatory program, RGGI was not proscribed by the Compact
Clause.
The success of RGGI is intertwined with the same compen-
satory tax doctrine that is at the heart of the constitutionality of
an efficacious carbon tax.  One obstacle RGGI faces is leakage.
Leakage would occur as a result of higher energy prices within
the states participating in RGGI.  Because energy prices would
be higher in New York, there would be an incentive for electric-
ity providers to buy energy from a state not participating in
RGGI because prices in the unregulated states would be lower.
One way to combat leakage would be to tax electricity imported
from outside of the regional compact, forcing generators within
the regional compact to account for electricity they deliver that
was generated outside the regional compact in setting the re-
gional cap.  However, just as under the carbon tax method of
regulation, this could be proscribed by the Commerce Clause
and potentially permitted under the compensatory tax doctrine.
A. The Economics
This Comment would be incomplete without at least ad-
dressing some of the economic concerns related to each method
of greenhouse gas emissions.  Each has its own strengths and
weaknesses, and its own champion in the academic or political
arena.  A carbon tax, a type of Pigovian tax,122 would reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by making emissions more expensive
for the polluter.  One weakness is that the optimal price at
which the tax should be set is unknown; a price set too low
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
121. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
122. See, e.g., Pigovian Tax, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigovian_tax.
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would not give industry the proper incentive to reduce emis-
sions, and a tax too high would encourage evasion.  Assuming a
proper price can be set based on the amount of damage emis-
sions cause, as well as the cost society is willing to incur to re-
duce emissions, another unknown is how much emissions will
actually decrease.  For example, despite rapid price increases,
the demand for gasoline has not substantially decreased due to
its inelasticity; that is, compared to many consumer goods, it is
difficult to find a cheap substitute.  The same may be true for
other carbon-based fuels.  Theoretically, emissions could remain
the same, or even increase, if companies decided that it was a
cost that would have to be internalized, or were able to pass the
cost on to consumers.  A carbon tax has many benefits as well,
in part because tax revenues could be used to partially offset
any undue burden on portions of society who are unable to af-
ford higher fuel prices.123
Under a properly administered market-based system, a cap
is set at a certain level that, in theory, will be achieved.  This
system has been championed by many politicians as the cure for
climate change.124  Politicians are loath to propose new taxes for
fear of being pilloried during election time.  This makes a mar-
ket-based system more palatable from a political standpoint.  It
does offer some assurance in actually achieving a desired reduc-
tion in greenhouse gas emissions, as long as the market func-
tions properly and maintains the cap.  A market-based system
has already been successful in reducing the emissions that cre-
ate acid rain, and is currently being used by the European
Union to meet its goals under the Kyoto Protocol.  Nonetheless,
many economists see a market-based system as sub-optimal, in
light of the long-term nature of climate change.125
123. See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, Editorial, Raise the Gas Tax, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 20, 2006, at A12.
124. See, e.g., America’s Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007).
125. See, e.g., Policy Options for Reducing CO2 Emissions, Congressional
Budget Office, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc/89xx/doc8934/02-12-Carbon.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 18, 2008).  The report makes a number of findings in comparing a tax
against a market-based cap-and-trade system (albeit at a national, rather than
state, level). Id.  It concludes that “[a] tax on emissions would be the most efficient
incentive-based option for reducing emissions and could be relatively easy to im-
plement.” Id.  Also, “[a] cap-and-trade program that included a price ceiling
(safety valve) and either a price floor or banking provisions could be significantly
more efficient than an inflexible cap, although somewhat less efficient than a tax.”
23
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B. A Recommendation for New York State
Neither a carbon tax nor a market-based system of green-
house gas emissions would be able to completely evade all con-
stitutional questions.  While each would seem to be permissible
under current Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence,
neither is free from doubt.
There are a few different reasons why a market-based sys-
tem of regulation seems to be the best way for New York State
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.  From a practical stand-
point, the market-based system clearly wins.  New York State,
along with many other participating states, has already in-
vested a substantial amount of time in creating RGGI.  The
chances of a carbon tax, by itself, being approved by the New
York State legislature is small, considering the political danger
of sponsoring legislation that would be framed as a tax hike.
Passing a carbon tax under the aegis of RGGI may be much
more palatable to legislators who are perpetually running for
reelection.
From a purely legal standpoint, a carbon tax may be prefer-
able.  It requires fairly routine state legislation and would only
need to survive a constitutional challenge under the Commerce
Clause.  A market-based system, to be successful, would need 1)
legislation to create the trading system (legislation that would
likely be much more onerous to draft than a carbon tax bill); 2)
to survive a constitutional challenge under the Compact Clause;
3) legislation to guard against leakage; and 4) to survive a chal-
lenge under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, there are more steps involved with the market-based
system.  New York, however, is in the unique position of having
already passed many of the initial steps in creating RGGI.  At
this point in time, it is a better option than a carbon tax.
There are still many issues that need to be resolved.  The
participating states need to pass legislation that would protect
Id.  Finally, “[a]nalysts generally conclude that a tax would be a more efficient
method of reducing CO2 emissions than an inflexible cap [because of] the contrast
between the long-term cumulative nature of climate change and the short-term
sensitivity of the cost of emission reductions . . . [L]imiting climate change would
require making substantial reductions in those emissions over many years, but
ensuring that any particular limit was met in any particular year would result in
little, if any, additional benefit (avoided damage).” Id. (emphasis in original).
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/4
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against leakage.  The proximity of electricity production in non-
participating states, such as Pennsylvania and Ohio, under-
scores the need to ensure that power plants within the partici-
pating states are not undercut by power plants in non-
participating states.  Another potentially vexing issue may be
how to incorporate brand new power plants into RGGI.  Per-
haps most importantly, RGGI does not have a robust enforce-
ment mechanism that can be exercised at the regional level.
This seems to have been done to avoid falling within the Com-
pact Clause.  While RGGI has not created a regional body capa-
ble of enforcement, it has left enforcement to the participating
states.  This argument could be problematic if the regional CO2
cap is not being maintained.  A state would have the burden of
bringing administrative action against a particular power plant
that has exceeded its permit.  One problem would be the
amount of influence a power plant could have over state offi-
cials; a regional body would be better insulated against undue
influence from industry interests.  Other potential problems
would arise if a state declined to proceed in its administrative
action against a polluter exceeding its permit limits, or if a state
does bring an administrative proceeding but loses.  How would
the cap be maintained if a particular power plant continued to
exceed its limits?  Would other power plants have to further re-
duce their emissions to compensate even after complying with
their own permit?  As long as there is no strong method of en-
forcement to send a clear signal to polluters, the ability of RGGI
to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions may be limited.
C. Conclusion
For New York State, the regulation of greenhouse gas emis-
sions through RGGI may be the best option at the present time.
In order to be successful, RGGI will need to address how to in-
corporate new power plants into the market, the compensatory
tax doctrine, and the enforcement of the regional cap.  Because
of the progress that has already been made, and the political
reticence of passing new tax legislation, RGGI presents the best
opportunity for New York State, as well as other participating
states, to combat climate change.  Furthermore, while new tax
legislation is easier to draft and implement than a brand new
regulatory regime, such as a cap-and-trade system, taxes can be
25
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just as easily reduced or eliminated.  While larger regulatory
regimes are often harder to create, they are also harder to fun-
damentally alter after implementation, due to the number of
stakeholders with vested interests in the new system.  Thus,
the inability for political opposition to dismantle a cap-and-
trade system is one strong reason to choose RGGI over a carbon
tax.  It is important to note that a federal approach to green-
house gas emissions would be far superior to state regulation,
both because of its scope and its ability to evade constitutional
prohibitions contained in the Commerce Clause and the Com-
pact Clause.  Lastly, I note that although I have presented only
two major options for states to consider in regulating green-
house gas emissions, a tax and a market-based cap-and-trade
system, these are not the only options available to state
lawmakers.  One potentially powerful option involves the imple-
mentation of newer and more stringent standards governing all
facets of business whose tangential effect would be to decrease
greenhouse gas emissions.126  No matter whether one favors one
type of greenhouse gas regulation over another, it is important
to keep the goal in sight: a market solution to what has been
called “the greatest market failure the world has ever seen.”127
126. See Richard L. Ottinger & Mindy Jayne, Global Climate Change Kyoto
Protocol Implementation: Legal Frameworks for Implementing Clean Energy Solu-
tions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 19 (2000) (collecting a comprehensive list of legal
mechanisms that can help combat climate change, including energy efficiency
standards, vehicle mileage standards, building code standards, and renewable en-
ergy incentives).
127. Michael Specter, Big Foot, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 2008 (quoting
economist Nicholas Stern), available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/
02/25/080225fa_fact_specter.
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/4
